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Estate of EDWIN PIERCE, Deceased. BELEN PIERCE 
SONTHEIMER, as Trnstee, etc., et ul., Appellants, v. 
MARJORIE A. PIEHCE, as Guardian, etc., et a1., 
Respondents. 
[1] Wills-Construction-Intention of Testator.-In interpreting 
a will the testator's intent is to be ascertained fro111 the lan-
guage used and, when an uncertainty appears on the face of 
the will, from the circulUstances under which it was executed. 
(Prob. Code, § 105.) 
[2] Adoption-Origin of Right.-The procedure for adoption is 
entirely statutory. 
[8] Id.-Mect.-Adoption creates a status to which the legal inci-
dents of the relation of parent and child attach. 
[4] Id.-E1fect.-Civ. Code, § 228, requires adoptive parents to 
regard adopted children as children born of such parents, but 
does not require persons other than adoptive parents to regard 
them as such in the drafting of private instruments, such as 
wills, trusts and deeds. 
[5] Wills-Designation of Takers-Adopted Children.-In deter-
mining the rights of an adopted child under a will, the con-
trolling question is not whether he would inherit from his 
adoptive parent under the statute of succession, but wheth(>t' 
he is included among the persons the testator intended to share 
in his estate. 
[8] Id.-Designation of Takers-"Issue."-The 1931 amendment 
of Probe Code, § 108, in omitting the word "is.'me" frow the 
terms of testamentary disposition included therein, indicates 
that the statute of succession is not to control the interprpta-
tion of the term "issue" as used in a will. 
[7] Id.-Designation of Takers. - When statutes defining terms 
used in designating takers in a will are not applicable, the 
rules of intestate succession apply only if the testator expresses 
an intention in the will to adopt them. 
[2] See 1 Cal.Jur. 41S; 1 Am.Jur. 622. 
[5] See 1 Am.Jur. 665. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 272; [2] Adoption, § 2; 
[3, 4] Adoption, § 30; [5] Wills, § 330; [6-10] Wills, § 325; [11] 
Wills, § 273; [12] Wills, § 296; [13] Evidence, § 159; [14] Appeal 
and Error, § 179; [15] Wills, § 274; [16] Wills, § 295; [17] Appeul 
and Error, § 1105~ 
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[8] Id.-Design3otion of T3okers.-The statutes of succession and 
the nnti-Iapse statute (Prob. Code, § 92), unlike Prob. Code, 
§ 108, relating to designation of takers in a will, do not pur-
port to prescribe a standard meaning for the terms "lineal 
descendant" or "lawful issue" as used in wills or other private 
instruments, and are therefore not controlling in the interpre-
tation of such documents. 
[9] Id.-Designation of T3okers-"L3owful Issue." - The qnestion 
whether an adopted child is included within the term "lawful 
issue," as used in a will, usually turns on the particular cir-
cumstances of each case. 
[1030, lOb] Id.-Design3otion of Takers-uLawful Issue." - An 
order instructing a trustee that adopted children took as law-
ful issue under a provision for distribution of a trust was un-
supported where the uncontradicted evidence showed the 
testator's opposition to the adoption manifested by a will dis-
inheriting the adoptive parent and the subsequent destruction 
of such will on the parent's promise not to adopt the children. 
[11] Id.-Construction-Intention of Test3otor.-If the terms of a 
will are unambiguous and are susceptible of only one meaning, 
the intent of the testator must be ascertained from the face of 
the instrument itself. 
[12] Id.-Oonstruction-Extrinsic Evidence. - Where an uncer-
tainty appears on the face of the will as to what the testator 
meant by the words "lawful issue," it is proper to admit evi-
dence of the circumstances preceding the execution of instru-
ment in order to determine his meaning. 
[13] Evidence-Remoteness.-The objection that evidence otfercd 
is too rl!mote goes to its probative value, rather than to its 
admissibility. 
[14] Appeal-Objections-Evidence - Sufficiency of Objection.-
When a g.·ncral objection to the admission of certain evi,l.·ncp 
is overruled by the trial court, the party against whom the 
ruling is made cannot raise for the first time on appeal a 
spel'ific objection thereto, unless the evidence is not admissible 
for any purpose. 
[15] Wills-Oonstruction - Intention of Testator - Surrounding 
Oircumst.ances.-The circuIllstances under which a will was 
executed may relate to events occurring before its execution 
and may be (:onsidered in ascertaining the testator's inb'ntion 
if they have relevance concerning his intention :1t tho time thft 
will was executed. 
[9] Adoptl'd child as within class in testamentary gift, notes, 
70 A.L.R. 621; 144 A.L.Bo. 670. 
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[16] Id.-Construction-Extrinsic Evidence.-Oral declarations of 
a testator relating to the disinheritance of an annuitant desig-
nated in the will are not instructions to a scrivener and are not 
admissible under that exception to the rule excluding evidence 
of such declarations to ascertain the testator's intent. (Prob. 
Code, § 105.) 
[17] Appeal-Presumptions-Rules on Appeal-Rule 62.-On an 
appeal on an agreed statement of facts, rule 52 of the Rules 
on Appeal is controlling, and the appellate court must deter-
mine from the record alone whether there is any evidence to 
.upport the judgment of the trial court. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County, on trustee's petition for instructions, declaring 
adopted children of deceased annuitant to be beneficiaries 
under a testamentary trust. John Gee Clark, Judge. Reversed. 
Warner, Peracca & Magana, Wagener & Brailsford, James 
O. Warner, Henry N. Cowan, "V. C. Shelton and George W. 
Burch, Jr., for Appellants. 
Bailey & Poe, Rufus Bailey and Carl N. Huff for Re-
spondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-By a holographic will dated March 1, 
1933, EdWin Pierce left his entire estate in trust. The will 
provided that a monthly annuity be paid to his widow, Edna 
Dyer Pierce and that the residue of the net income be divided 
in . ten equal shares, two shares to each of the four children 
of a deceased brother and one share to each of the two chil-
. dren of a deceased niece. The provisions requiring construc-
tion are: 
(1) "Should any of the annuitants, children or grand-
children of my late brother, W. A. Pierce, die before the 
final distribution of my estate, his or her annuity shall be 
distributed in equal shares to his or her children (lawful 
issue), until finnl distribution. 
(2) "At the death of the last of the annuitants, Edna 
Dyer Pierce, William J. Pierce, Grace P. Holland, Chas. A. 
Pierce and Harry A. Pierce, it is my will that my estate be 
Jiquidated and distributed in equal shares, to and among 
the surviving graullchildren of my late brother 'Villiam A. 
Pierce, said grandchildren being the lawful issue, of the chil. 
dren of my late brother, William A. Pierce." (Underlining 
by the testator.) 
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At the date of the testator's death on April 14, 1935, 
Harry A. Pierce, one of the designated beneficiaries of the 
trust, had no children. In 1943, he and his wife, Marjorie A. 
Pierce, adopted lola Ann Pierce, anil in 1944, they adopted 
Dolores Amelia Pierce. Harry A. Pierce died in 1945 and 
Marjorie A. Pierce, acting as guardian ad litem for the two 
children, made a claim in their behalf for his annuity upon 
the trustee. The trustee then petitioned the trial court for 
instructions to determine whether the adopted children were 
entitled to receive the annuity. The trial court entered an 
orlier that they were. The trustee and beneficiaries appeal. 
The question for determination on this appeal is whether 
the testator llsed the term "lawful issue" to exclude adopted 
children. Respondent contends that the statutes governing 
the status of the children and their rights to inherit con-
trol the construction of this term. Section 228 of the Civil 
Code establishes the relationship of parent and child between 
an adopted child and the adoptive parent, and section 257 
of the Probate Code, incorporating the rule of In r(~ Newman, 
75 Cal. 213, 219 [16 P. 887, 7 Am.St.Rep. 146], provides that 
an adopted child succeeds to the estate of an adoptive parent 
in the same manner as a natural child. It was held in In re 
Newman, supra, that an adopted child is included within the 
meaning of the term "issue" as then used in the statute of 
succession. "If the adopted child is by virtue of its .'~tatus 
to be • regarded and treated in all respects as the child of 
the person adopting/ and is to 'have all the rights and bc 
subject to all the duties of the legal relation of parent and 
child,' the right to succeed to the estate of the deceased parent 
must be included." (In re Newman, supra, 75 Cal. 213, 219.) 
[1] Even though an adopted child has a status with 
respect to its adoptive parent identical to that of a child born 
of such parent and succeeds to the estate of an adoptive parent 
in the same manner as a child born of such parent, it does 
not follow that such status is determinative in construing 
the terms of a will. It is fundamental in the interpretation 
of wills that the testator's intent be derived from the lnn-
guage of the will itself and, under Probate Code, section 
105, when an uncertainty appears upon the face of the will, 
from the circumstances under which it was executed. 
[2] The procedure for adoption, unknown at common law, 
is entirely statutory. (Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 522 
[126 P. 161, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 214].) [3] Adoption creates 
... 
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a status to which attach the legal incidents of the relation of 
parE'nt and child. [4] Section 228 of the Civil Code defines 
the rights and duties between an adoptive parent and the 
adopted child and requires adoptive parents to regard adopted 
children as children born of such parents. It does not, how-
ever, require persons other than adoptive parents to rer-ard 
them as such in the drafting of private instruments such as 
wills, trusts, and deeds. "The adoption statutes of this state 
do not purport to affect the relationship of any person other 
than that of the parents by blood, the adopting parents, and 
the child. It is the person adopting the child who, by the 
express terms of the section, after adoption 'shall sustain 
towards each other the legal relation of parent and child 
and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that 
relation ... '" (In re Darling, 173 Cal. 221, 225 [159 P. 
606].) Even under the statute of succession, adopted 
children are not regarded as children born of the adoptive 
parents with respect to inheritance from relatives of the 
adoptive parents. (Estate of Pence, 117 Cal.App. 323, 333 
[4 P.2d 202]; Estate of Jones, 3 Cal.App.2d395, 400 [39 
. P.2d 847].) "The adoption simply fixes the stat11,S of the 
child as to its former and adopted parents. To its grand-
parents by blood it continues to be a grandchild, and the 
child of-its parents by blood. It does not acquire new grand-
parents in the persons of the father and mother of an adopt-
ing parent." (1ft re Darling, supra, 173 Cal. 221, 226.) 
[5] In the determination of the rights of an adopted child 
under a will, the controlling question is not whether the 
adopted child would inherit from its adoptive parent under 
the statute of succession. but whether the adopted child is 
included among the persons the testator intended to share 
in his estate. (Puterbaugh's E.~tate, 261 Pa. 235, 241 [104 A. 
601, 5 A.L.R. 1277] ; Oomer v. Oomer, 195 Ga. 79 [23 S.E.2d 
420, 424, 144 A.L.R. 664] ; see 1 Am.Jur. 665.) 
[6] Section 108 of the Probate Court provides: "A tes-
tamentary disposition to 'heirs.' 'relations,' 'nearest rela-
tions,' 'representatives,' 'legal representatives, ' 'personal 
rupresentatives,' 'family,' 'nearest (or next) of kin' of any 
p.:rSOll, without other words of qualification. . . . vests the 
property of such person, according to the provisions of Divi-
sion II of this code .... " Before its amendment in 1931 this 
section also included the term "issue." This amendment 
clearly indicates that the statute of succession was not to 
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control the interpretation of the term" issue" as used in a 
will. [7] When statutes like section 108 are not applicable, 
the rules of intestate succession apply only if the testator 
expresses an intention in the will to adopt such rules. (See 
Estate of Watts, 179 Cal. 20,22 [175 P. 415].) 
Respondent also relies on Estate of Moore, 7 Cal.App. 
2d 722, 724 [47 P.2d 533, 48 P.2d 28], Estate of Tibbetts, 
48 Cal.App.2d 177,178 [119 P.2d 368], and Estate of Esposito, 
57 Cal.App.2d 859, 865 [135 P.2d 167], holding that adopted 
children are "lineal descendants" within the meaning of 
section 92 of the Probate Code, which prevents the lapse of 
a testamentary devise or bequest to kindred, if the devisee or 
legatee predeceases the testator but leaves lineal descendants 
surviving the testator. Although a beneficiary takes directly 
under the will of the testator· under such an anti-lapse statute, 
he does so because the statute substitutes him for the pre-
deceased devisee or legatee. He takes, not by virtue of the 
expressed intentions of the testator, but solely by virtue of 
the statute. Section 228 of the Civil Code compels the result 
in these cases as it does in the succession cases. As stated in 
Estate of Moor8 (supra, at 724): "The law applicable to the 
present controversy and creating the status is found in section 
228 of the Civil Code providing that 'after adoption the two 
shall sustain towards each other the legal relation of parent 
and child, and have all the rights and be subject to all the 
duties of that relation.' . . . That such adopted child is to 
be considered as 'issue' and a lineal descendant of the adopt-
ing parent, has been on several occasions recognized by our 
courts. • .. To exclude adopted children from its scope would 
be to say that they are not entitled as to the adopting parent. 
to the full rights of natural children, which is contrary to the 
express provision of the statute." 
[8] In construing the statutes of succession and the anti-
lapse statute, the courts were concerned primarily with car-
rying out the intention of the Legislature (Civ. Code, § 228) 
that adopted children be given the same rights under the 
statutes of this state as those enjoyed by natural children. 
(See, also, Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal. 468, 469 [74 P. 
10].) These statutes and the cases thereunder, however, un-
like section 108 of the Probate Code, do not purport to pre. 
scribe a standard meaning for the terms "lineal ue:;ceudant" 
or "lawful issue" as used in wills or other private instru-
ments, and are therefore not controlling in the interpretation 
of wills or other private instruments. 
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[9] The question whether an adopted child is included 
within the meaning of "lawful issue" as used in a will usually 
turns on the particular circumstances of each case. Thus the 
meaning of "lawful issue" has been dctermined from the 
general scheme or purpose of a will considered as a whole 
(Middletown Trust 00. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 69 [112 A. 
689] j Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 11 [149 A. 515, 70 
A.L.R. 608] ; New York Life Ins. d7 Trust 00. v. Viele, 161 
N.Y. 11, 20 [55 N.E. 311, 76 Am.St.Rep. 238]; Oomer v. 
Oomer, supra, 195 Ga. 79 [23 S.E.2d 420, 424, 144 A.L.R. 
664] ; 'Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 681 [142 S.W.2d 680]), 
or from the fact that the testator used different term~ such 
as heirs, issue, and children interchangeably to identify the 
same persons (Hall v. Orandall, 25 Del.Ch. 339 [20 A.2d 545, 
547] ; Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 158-159 [147 N.E. 788] ; 
Oook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 644 [228 N.W. 629] ; see 
Everitt v. La Speyre, 195 Ga. 377 [24 S.E.2d 381, 384]). 
Moreover, the meaning of the term has frequently been de-
termined by the circumstances surrounding the execution of 
the will, such as the testator's knowledge of the adoption and 
his approval or disapproval thereof (Ansonia Nat. Bank v. 
Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 748 [136 A. 588] ; Middletown Trust 
00. v. Gaffey, supra, 96 Conn. 61, 71; Munie v. Gruenewald, 
289 Ill. 468, 472 [124 N.E. 605] ; In re McEwan, 128 N.J.Eq. 
140, 147-[15 A.2d 340] ; Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 
469, 474-475 [17 A.2d 517]; see notes, 70 A.L.R. 621, 144 
A.L.R. 670), or the testator's knowledge of the inability of 
persons, whose "issue" are provided for in the will, to bear 
children. (Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, supra, 753; Beck 
v. Dickinson, 99 Ind.App. 463,466 [192 N.E. 899] ; see Bray v. 
Mt."les, 23 Ind.App. 432 [54 N.E. 446,55 N.E. 510].) "Since 
the language of different wills is so varied and the circum-
stances surrounding the testators are so different, decisions 
in will construction cases are of 1(>.88 value as guides or author-
ity than is the case in almost any other branch of the law .... 
each will must be construed in the light of its own particular 
phraseology and the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the testator at the time of its execution." (Thompson on Wills 
(3d ed.), pp. 324-325.) 
[lOa] The circumstances preceding the execution of the 
will in the present case indicate that the testator intended to 
nse "lawful issue" in its ordinary nwaning as offspring of 
parentage (3 Page on Wi.11s 152; cases collected in 117 A.L.R. 
272 ESTATE OF PIERCE [32 C.2d 
691) to exclude adopted children. At the trial there was in-
troduced into evidence the testimony of Edna Dyer Pierce, 
the widow of the testator, who testified to an oral conversa-
tion that took place in the presence of the testator and to 
other circumstances that occurred before the making of the 
will. The widow testified that at a time before the execution 
of the will she had a conversation with the testator in the 
presence of a nephew relating to the plaM of Harry A. Pierce 
to adopt lola .A.nn. who at that time was approximately 2 
years of age; that during the conversation the nephew had 
informed the testator of the contemplated adoption and the 
testator then said: "If God spares my life until tomorrow, 
:lnd I can get down to my bank, I am going to disinherit 
Harry"; that Harry, being informed of the testator's state 
of mind, promised him that he would not adopt lola Ann or 
Dolores Amelia; that the testator destroyed a will that he 
had executed for the very purpose of disinheriting Harry. 
The disinheriting will, which was torn and thrown into a waste-
basket, was retrieved by the widow and preserved; this docu-
ment was introduced into evidence at the trial. Edna Dyer 
Pierce further testified that one of the reasons that the tes-
tator did not like these minor children was the fact thnt thl~ 
husband of the mother of the children stated to the testator 
that he was not the father of the second child, since he WaK in 
jail at the time the child was conceived and could not havo 
been the father. This was the only evidenee received at the 
trial relating to the construction of the language of the will. 
Section 105 of the Probate Code provides: "When there 
is an imperfect description, or no person or property exactly 
answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be cor-
rected, if the error appears from the context of the will or 
from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of 
the testator as to his intentioll8; and when an uncertainty 
arises upon the face of a will, as to the application of any 
of its provisions, tb~ testator's intention is to be n..~certain~d 
from the words of the will, taking into view the circumstanccli 
nnder which it was made, excluding such oral declarations." 
[11] If the terms of the will are unambigious and are sus-
c~ptib)e of only one meaning the intent of the testator must 
be gathered from the face of the instrument itself. (Estute. 
0/ Watts, supra, 179 Cal. 20, 23; Estate 0/ 80ulie, 72 Cnl. 
App.2d 332, 335 [164 P.2d 565]; Estate 0/ Owens, 62 Cal. 
App.2d 772, 774 [145 P.2d 376]; Vincent v. 8ecurity-F'irsf 
) 
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Nat. Bank, 67 Cal.App.2d 602, 610 [155 P.2d 63].) This will, 
however, is not clear on its face. [12] The testator used" law-
ful issue" to qualify or restrict the meaning of children or 
grandchildren. As a layman using the words "lawful issue" 
in a holographic will he may have intended to distinguish 
legitimate from illegitimate children, adopted from natural 
children, legitimate children of the blood of the testator from 
adopted or illegitimate children, or he may have intended to 
include children of his legatees that they rcgard as their law-
ful issue. In view of the uncertainty appearing on the face 
of the will, it was proper for the trial court to admit evidence 
of the circumstances preceding thc execution of the instru-
ment to determine what the testator meant by "children 
(lawful issue)" in the first provision quoted above, and by 
"grandchildren being the lawful, issue" in the second pro-
vision quoted above. 
[13] Respondent contends that the extrinsic evidence 
was inadmissible on the ground that it was too remote from 
the date of the execution of the will. That contention, how-
ever, relates to the probative value to be given such evidence, 
not to its admissibility. It cannot be seriously contended 
that such evidence wa.o; not sufficiently relevant to the testa-
tor's attitude toward the adopted children. (Trowbridge v. 
Trowbridge, supra, 127 Conn. 469, 471; Munie v. Gruenewald, 
lupra, ~9S Ill. 468, 472; see Beck v. Dickinson, supra, 99 
Ind.,App. 463.) [14] In any event, since the respondent 
interposed only a general objection to the admission of the 
testimony of the widow, thn question of its admissibility on 
the specific ground of remoteness cannot now be eonsidered 
on appeal. It is well settled that when a genera] objection 
to the admission of certain evidence is .overruled by the 
trial court, the party against whom the ruling is made can-
not raise for the first timc on appeal a specific objection 
thoreto, unless the \!yidl!ncc is not admiFudblc for any pur-
pose. (Orocker v. Carpenter, 98 Cal. 418, 421 [33 P. 271]; 
Christiansen v. Holling .• , 44 Ca1.App.2d 332, 340 [112 P.2d 
723] ; Gularte v. Martins, 65 Cal.App.2d 817, 821 [151 P.2d 
570] .) 
[15] The circumstances under which the will was exe-
~uted may relate to events occurring before its execution, if 
they have relevance concerning the intention of the testator 
at the! time the will was executed. (See Thompson on 'Vills 
8up"a, at p. 488.) Accordingl~r, in several California cases 
i 
! , 
1 
1 
I I, 
! 
1· 
, 
JI 
'/ 
J 
;.) 
) 
274 ES'l'A'fl!: 01<' PIEUCE [32 C.2d 
circumstances existing years before the execution of a will 
have been considered in the interpretation of wills to deter-
mine the testator's intentions as they existed at the time of 
the execution of the will. (Estate 01 Dominici, 151 Cal. 181, 
188 [90 P. 448] ; Estate 01 Mitchell, 160 Cal. 618, 623 [117 
P. 774]; Estate 01 Hotaling, 72 Cal.App.2d 848 [165 P.2d 
681] ; Estate 01 Johmon, 107 Cal.App. 236, 239 [290 P.314] ; 
Estate 0/ Wiersbickll, 69 CaLApp.2d 690, 693 [159 P.2d. 
699].) 
[16] Although section 105 of the Probate Code clearly· 
permits the introduction of evidence of circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of a will, when there is an uncer-
tainty on the face of the will as to the application of any 
of its provisions, it specifically provides that oral declara-
tions of the testator cannot be considered to determine his 
intentions. This section has been construed, however, not 
to exclude oral declarations that consist of instructions to a 
scrivener. (Estate of Dominici, IUpra, 151 Cal. 181; Estate of 
Little, 170 Cal. 52 [148 P. 194J ; Estats 01 Donnellan, 164 Cal. 
14 [127 P. 166]; Estats of Hotaling, supra, 72 Cal.App.2d 
848,856.) The testator's statements relating to the disinheri-
tance of Harry A. Pierce were not instructions to a scrivener 
and therefore do not come within this exception. (See Estate 
of Johmon, IUpra, 107 Cal.App. 236, 240; Estate of Maloney, 
27 Cal.App.2d 332, 335 [80 P.2d 998].) 
[lOb] There is sufficient evidence of circumstances be-
fore the execution of the will, exclusive of the testator's 
declarations, however, to support the conclusion that the 
testator intended to exclude adopted children from taking 
under the will. The uncontradicted testimony shows t.hat 
the testator was opposed to the adoption of these children 
and that his opposition was manifested by the execution of 
a will disinheriting the adoptive parent; that the testator 
destroyed the disinheriting will on the promise of Harry A. 
Pierce that he would not adopt these children. [17] This ap-
peal is upon an agreed statement of facts, and therefore rule 52 
of the Rules on Appeal is controlling: "If a record on ap-
peal does not contain all of the papers, records and oral 
proceedings, but is certified by the judge or the clerk, or stip-
ulated to by the parties, in accordance with these rules, it 
shall be presumed in the absence of proceedings or aug-
mentation that it includes all matters material to a determi-
nation of the points on appeal." Thus, this court must 
.) 
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determine from this record alone whether tli.'J"e was any 
evidence to support the judgment of the trial .~ourt. (Sec 
Alkus v. Johnson-Pacific Co., 80 Cal. App.2d 1, 8 l18l P.2d 
72, 76].) Since the only evidence in the agreed statement 
shows that the testator did not intend that the adopted chil-
dren should take under the will, there is no evidence to sup-
port the order of the trial court. 
The order is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. 
I am convinced that the order of the trial court holding 
that the testator intended the adopted children of the an-
nuitants to be included in the term "children, lawful issue" 
should be affirmed. 
The general rule is that the findings of a trial court 
should be liberally construed and any inconsistency therein 
so resolved as to uphold rather than defeat its judgment. 
(Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Ca1.2d 95. 109 [173 P.2d 17]; 
Menghetti v. Dillon, 10 Cal.2d 470, 472 [75 P.2d 596]; 
Ensele v. Jolley, 188 Cal. 297, 303 [204 P. 1085] ; Murray v. 
Tulare Irrigation Co., 120 Cal. 311, 315 [49 P. 563, 52 P. 
586]; Bell v. Scudder, 78 Cal.App.2d 448, 457 [177 P.2d 
796].) in this case, by giving a liberal construction to the 
findings of the trial court, its order can, and should, be 
affirmed on the following grounds: (1) That the trial court 
realized the error it committed by first holding that there 
was an ambiguity in the will in the use of the phrase "law-
ful issue"; (2) That the trial court, in accord with the 
general rule, disregarded evidence erroneously admitted and 
cured its own error by finding against such evidence; ( 3 ) 
That the trial court refused to believe the evidence contrary 
to its findings. 
The first and most basic question is whether there is pres-
ent in the will here involved the condition precedent to 
the admission of extrinsic evidence: Ambiguity, or as the 
code puts it, "uncertainty." (Prob. Code, § 105.) Without 
such uncertainty, extrinsic evidence of any kind is inadmis-
sible for the purpose of determining the intent of the tes-
tator. 
In this case, the trial court originally held that there was 
an ambiguity, and therefore admitted the evidence. But on 
) 
) 
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further consideration, the court may very well have come to 
the conclusion that it had erred. If no "uncertainty" ex-
isted, the matter became one purely of law for the court to 
decide. The evidence could be disregarded. Here, the 
evidence was obviously disregarded. There is a logical ex-
planation for this disregard. No prejudice can result to any 
one if the court, after making an error in receiving evidence, 
realizes the error and cures it by giving the document be-
fore it the interpretation it should have received from the 
start. 
Construing the language used in the will under California 
law as required by Probate Code, section 100, it was entirely 
reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the testator 
had in fact not intended to exclude the adopted children of 
the various annuitants by the use of the term "children, 
lawful issue." This interpretation should be permitted to 
stand. It is not only reasonable but also in line with the 
general trend expressed in statutes and cases in this state 
under which the status of an adopted child is approximated 
as closely as possible to that of a natural child. 
In this connection, it may be conceded that up to this time, 
the California cases and statutes involved only questions of 
succession and pretermission rather' than the interpretation 
of documents. The trend in favor of adopted children is 
nevertheless clear and so is the rule: 
" [T] he rule is well settled that where the construction 
given to an instrument by a trial court is reasonable and 
appears to be consistent with the intent of the party making 
it, courts of appellate jurisdiction will not substitute an-
other interpretation, even though it may seem equally ten-
able with that accorded by the trial court." (Estate of 
Northcutt, 16 CaL2d 683, 690 [107 P.2d 607], and cases 
there cited.) 
Under this reasoning, the trial court was bound to dis-
regard the extrinsic evidence and had to determine the in-
tention of the testator on the basis of the words used in the 
will itself in accordance with section 105 of the Probate 
Code. The alleged disregard of the evidence was therefore 
entirely proper and did not constitute error. 
The decision of the trial court receives further support 
from the following rule: 
". . . that where by the terms of the will it is not made 
clear nor certain that an intestacy-whether partial or total 
) 
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-was intended, an interpretation which will avoid intestacy 
will be adopted." (Estate of Northcutt, 16 Ca1.2d 683, 689 
[107 P.2d 607], and many cases there cited.) 
In this case, there would unquestionably be an intestacy 
if respondents are excluded. There is not the slightest in-
dication of an intent to create such an intestacy in the will. 
The trial court therefore correctly concluded that the respond-
ents were intended to take under the will. 
Next, if it is conceded for the sake of argument that the 
use of the term e e lawful issue" in the will created an Ull-
certainty within the meaning of section 105 of the Probate 
Code, the oral declarations of the testator are still inadmis-
sible under that same section. The majority opinion recog-
nizes that rule but accords it lip service only. 
'fhe evidence contained in the agreed statement of facts 
shows that respondents' counsel made immediate objection 
to the admission of declarations of the testator. The objec-
tion was general as well as specific and stated the rule laid 
down in section 105 of the Probate Code. The following 
excerpt from the agreed statement of facts shows that the 
trial court misunderstood counsel for appellants: 
"Mr. Shelton : We are offering this testimony as to the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the man at the time 
when the wjll was e;xecuted and the facts thereto so as to 
make the court conversant with them. 
e'The Oourt : You are not seeking by this witness to 
introduce any statement of the testator with reference to 
this language' 
"Mr. Shelton: Yes, directly bearing on that in declara-
tions that he had no intention . . ." 
The trial court -then overruled the objection, evidently 
thinking that the declarations of the testator would not be 
introduced. The question asked by the trial court showed 
that it was aware of the rule under which such declarations 
would not be admissible. Afterwards, when the inadmissi-
bility of the evidence came to light, the trial court must have 
realized that it was subject to reversal if it rendered a de-
cree based on inadmissible evidence. (P·;'shbaugh v. Fish-
ba-ugh, 15 Ca1.2d 445, 457 [101 P.2d 1084].) Und~r those 
circumstances, it was the duty of the trial court to dIsregard 
the inadmissible portion of the evidence. On appeal, it is 
presumed that the trial court disregards inadmissible evi-
dence which has crept into the record. 
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"In general, it will be assumed on appeal, where the case 
is tried by the court without a jury, that the court con-
sidered only proper and competent evidence in making its 
findinb"S and did not consider other evidence which has been 
admitted erroneously and it will be presumed that such 
evidence was disregarded." (5 C.J .S. 405.) The same gen-
eral rule is stated in almost identical words in 3 American 
Jurisprudence at page 505 and is supported by many cases. 
(Bisno v. Herzberg, 75 Cal.App.2d 235, 241 [170 P.2d 
973]; Oordi v. Garcia, 56 Cal.App.2d 584, 588 [132 P.2d 
887] ; Farmers etc. Nat. Bank v. 8towell, 6 Cal.App.2d 373, 
378 [44 P.2d 392].) 
... 
Looking at the record in the light of this presumption, 
it is evident that the admissible portion of the evidence, that 
is, that portion which the trial court was under a duty to 
conSIder, shows nothing but the facts that the testator once 
made and tore up a will and that he became angry on one 
occasion. And while it may be conceded that this might 
have been enough evidence to support the conclusion of the . 
trial court, had it concluded that the intention of the testa-
tor was to exclude the adopted children of the annuitants, 
the fact remains that it found to the contrary. Such evi-
dence as was left certainly did· not compel the trial court 
to find one way or the other. A torn will and an outburst 
of rage are equivocal acts, capable of any number of inter-
pretations. It is ax~omatic that under such circumstances 
the result reached by the trial court should not be disturbed. 
Finally, if it is assumed that the words used in the will 
not only created an "uncertainty" but that the extrinsic 
evidence contained in the agreed statement of facts was ad-
missible (and neither of these points is conceded), the trial 
court was still free to disbelieve the uncontradicted evi-
dence of the only witness, and evidently did disbelieve it. 
In a recent case, when speaking of uncontradicted evidence, 
the majority of this court said: "But, of course, the trial 
court was not required to believe their testimony. The trial 
court is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence 
and the credibility of the witnesses. It is its province to 
give to the evidence that weight to which, in its judgment, 
it is entitled, and to draw all reasonable inferences there-
from, and if, in its judgment, the evidence is entitled to no 
weight it may disregard such evidence altogether. (24 Cal. 
Jur. 886, sec. 135.) II (OampbeU v. Birch, 19 Cal.2d 778, 
) 
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789 [122 P.2J 902J.) 'l'u~ dissl'ntillg juuges in this case 
concurred with the majority on the point mentioned. Page 
803 of 19 Ca1.2d: " ... first that the trial court could have 
disbelieved defendants' evidence Oll the subject j and second 
that an inference ... arose. With the first I agree, but 
... " (See, also, Trctkeway v. Tretheway, 16 Ca1.2d 133 
[104 P.2d 1033].) 
'l'here can be no question but that the trial court in this 
case disregarded or disbelieved the evidence produced at 
the trial as to the testator's intention with respect to the 
adopted children. This the trial court obviously had the 
right to do. (Estate of Bristol (1943), 23 Ca1.2d 221 [143 
P.2d 689]; Tretkeway v. Tretkeway (1940), 16 Ca1.2d 133 
[104 P.2d 1033].) 
In my opinion no ambiguity exists in the meaning of the 
words used. But if it is conceded that an uncertainty arose, 
whether some or all of the evidence was admissible or not, 
there is still a reasonable and logical explanation for the 
action taken by the trial court. 
In a case of this nature, reflections of this kind are re-
moved from the realm of conjecture by the presumption that 
the trial court acted in the proper discharge of its office and 
did not reach an arbitrary result. The cases cited supra, 
show tliat this court has often reeognized the necessity for 
liberal construction in order to sustain rather than reverse 
a trial court. The rule that the trial court is presumed to 
disregard inadmissible evidence in the record is ill line with 
this general principle. In this case, the majority opinion 
usurps the function of the trial court and reverses it where, 
under the settled rules above outlined, it could and should 
be affirmed. 
Schauer, J .. concurred. 
